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Abstract—We consider the impact of incomplete information
on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with
one source node, one destination node, and multiple relay nodes.
All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their
own profit instead of the social welfare. We consider the practical
situation where the channel state on any given relay path is not
observable to the source or to the other relays. We examine
different bargaining relationships between the source and the
relays, and propose a framework for analyzing the efficiency
loss induced by incomplete information. We analyze the source
of the efficiency loss, and quantify the amount of inefficiency
which results.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is now widespread awareness of the importance of
incentives in the management of communication networks [1]–
[6]. Network nodes often cannot be relied upon to cooper-
atively implement network algorithms in the service of the
social good. Instead, selfish nodes will behave in a given
manner only if it is profitable for them to do so. Of clear
interest is the impact of such selfish actions on the social
good. From the network point of view, it is important to
design incentives such as pricing schemes, which induce
selfish behavior aligned with the social good.
In single-hop networks, the incentive issue and its impact on
social efficiency have been extensively studied. In [7], [8], the
authors considered the Nash Equilibrium for selfish routing,
in which source packets choose paths to the destination to
minimize their individual latency, rather than complying with
a global routing algorithm to achieve social optimality. In [9]
and [10], the authors consider network service pricing for in-
ternet service providers. They showed that cooperation among
multiple service providers is required when their links are
used by common users. In [11], the authors study competitive
behavior among multiple parallel links, and characterized the
efficiency loss due to competition.
The issue of incentives has also been investigated for multi-
hop networks. A number of papers [12]–[14] advocate the
use of credits to provide incentives for network nodes to
cooperate. In [15], the authors investigate the impact of het-
erogeneous traffic on the pricing of network service providers.
Selfish behavior has also been investigated in the context of
cooperative relay networks. In [16], the authors considered
a nonlinear pricing game, where the relay nodes propose
nonlinear charging functions to the source, and the source
allocates the traffic to minimize the payment to relay nodes.
In [17], the authors considered a Stackelberg bargaining game,
in which the relay nodes cooperate as one party in competing
with the source node.
All the above papers assume a complete information setting
where players in the network game have complete knowledge
about quantities such as the state of network links. In practice,
this assumption is often too strong. Information regarding
network quantities is typically incomplete and imperfect. In
an internet service provider (ISP) pricing game, for instance,
the characteristics and service requirements of the users can be
opaque to the service providers [18]. In a multi-hop network
such as the Internet, a source does not typically have perfect
information on the congestion state of links a few hops away
[19]. Finally, in wireless networks, the source usually cannot
observe or test the channel state from a relay to the destination.
Neither can a relay observe the channel state from other relays
to the destination. Given the above, it is clear that in analyzing
selfish behavior in network settings, the role of incomplete
information must be emphasized.
One approach to network design problems with incomplete
information is through dominant implementable mechanisms
[20]. This idea has been used in the context of spectrum
auctions [21] and communication networks [22]. These mech-
anisms, however, require a centralized authority and extra
funding from an outsider. This makes the extension to general
multi-hop networks difficult. Another approach, based on the
idea of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, a generalization of the
Nash Equilibrium concept, is advocated in [23]. Here, the
authors consider selfish routing in a single-hop network, where
every source node knows only its own traffic requirement,
but has knowledge of the traffic distribution of other sources.
While the results in [23] are appealing, it remains unclear how
they might extend to the multi-hop network situation.
In this work, we investigate the impact of incomplete
information on the problem of pricing and incentives in a
two-hop parallel relay network. We consider two scenarios,
one in which the source has limited bargaining power and one
in which the source has full bargaining power. In the limited
bargaining power scenario, the source can only react passively
to the relays’ signals, and the game can be considered to be a
pricing game. For this case, we show that all Nash Equilibria
in the complete information game are efficient, including those
induced by linear charging functions. We then characterize the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the incomplete information
game in which relays propose linear pricing functions, and
show that incomplete information can induce inefficiencies,
which are exacerbated by asymmetric prior knowledge on
the type distribution. Next, in the scenario where the source
has full bargaining power, the source is allowed to provide
a general contract. For this case, we first show that in the
game with complete information, (Bayesian) Nash equilibria
exist and are all efficient. Next, we investigate the game
with incomplete information. To deal with the difficulty of
characterizing the Bayesian Nash Equilibria in this case, we
first show that if a resource allocation outcome can be realized
by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists a “truth
telling” Bayesian Nash equilibrium that realizes the outcome.
We then show that the set of outcomes for the “truth telling”
Bayesian Nash equilibria is included in the set of outcomes for
the Nash equilibria for a complete information game, in which
the link cost functions are replaced by specified “virtual cost
functions.” Using this approach, we obtain for a symmetric
network scenario a bound on the amount of inefficiency which
may result from incomplete information.
II. NETWORK MODEL
A. Network Traffic Allocation
In wireline and wireless networks, it is often the case that
an information source cannot directly reach its destination,
but must do so with the aid of intermediate relays. We model
such a situation as follows. Consider a parallel relay network
modelled by a directed graph G = (V,E), with a single source
s, destination d, and a set of relays I , where |I| = n. We
assume that there is no direct link between s and d. Instead,
The relays in I are used to forward traffic in a two-hop fashion
from s to d.
The source wishes to maintain a certain rate of transmission
with the destination. We shall consider two scenarios. In
the first inelastic scenario, the source has a fixed rate rs
of transmission. This rate must be carried by the relays in
I , where the traffic rate forwarded by relay i is ri, and∑n
i=1 ri = rs. In the second elastic scenario, the source may
be willing to withhold some of its transmission rate, according
to how the cost of sending traffic affects it overall utility. Let
r0 denote the amount of traffic withheld or rejected. Then
rs − r0 is the total admitted traffic from the source. A traffic
vector r , (r0, r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn+1+ is a feasible routing of the
source traffic if it satisfies r0 +
∑n
i=1 ri = rs.
B. Cost Function and Utility Function
In general, for any relay node i, there is a cost involved
in forwarding traffic for source s. This cost typically depends
both on the properties of the links adjacent on relay i and
the amount of traffic flowing through those links. Denote the
traffic flow on link (i, j) ∈ E by fij . We assume that link
(i, j) has a cost function Cij(θij , fij) with Cij(θij , 0) = 0,
where θij is a measure of the quality of link (i, j). This
quality may have different physical meanings in different
contexts. For example, if the cost function reflects the queu-
ing delay on (i, j), then using the M/M/1 approximation,
Cij(θij , fij) =
fij
kij−fij
. Here, θij denotes the link capacity kij .
For another example, consider the cost of power assumption
required for transmitting traffic of rate fij over a wireless
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link with channel gain gij , bandwidth W , and receiver noise
power N . Using the Shannon capacity formula, we have
fij = W log(1+ gijPij/N), where Pij is transmission power
required on link (i, j). Thus, the link cost is
Cij(θij , fij) =
N
gij
(2fij/W − 1).
Here, θij denotes the channel gain gij .
Now consider the overall cost Ci(θi, ri) for relay node i
to forward traffic of rate ri from source s to destination d,
where θi measures the quality or type of the path from s
to d through i. We assume that Ci(θi, ri) = Csi(θsi, ri) +
Cid(θid, ri). The costs Ci(θi, ri) are particularly amenable to
analysis if θi can be expressed as a simple scalar function
of θsi and θid: θi = h(θsi, θid). This is true in the example
of the power consumption cost function given above, where
θij = gij is the channel gain on link (i, j). Normalizing the
bandwidth and receiver noise power to 1, we have
Ci(θi, ri) = Psi + Pid
= (2ri − 1)/gsi + (2
ri − 1)/gid
= (2ri − 1)θ−1i , (1)
where θi , (g−1si +g
−1
id )
−1 = (θ−1si +θ
−1
id )
−1
. In this paper, we
focus on situations where the path quality θi can be expressed
as a scalar function of θsi and θid. We further assume that θi
belongs to a compact interval [θi, θi].
Motivated by the power consumption example, we as-
sume that Ci(θi, ri) is twice continuously differentiable on
[θi, θi] × [0, rs], and strictly increasing and convex in ri:
∂Ci(θi, ri)/∂ri > 0 and ∂2Ci(θi, ri)/∂r2i > 0. Also, assume
that Ci(θi, ri) is strictly decreasing in θi: ∂Ci(θi, ri)/∂θi < 0.
Furthermore, assume ∂2Ci(θi, ri)/∂θi∂ri ≤ 0.
Now consider the source s. In the inelastic case, source
s sends traffic at a fixed rate rs into the network. In the
elastic case, source s may withhold traffic of rate r0 from
the network, and send the other part of the traffic rs− r0 into
the network. Let the utility function of the source be given by
Ws(θs, r), where θs ∈ [θs, θs] parameterizes the utility for the
source, and r is the source rate admitted into the network. For
example, the source utility may be Ws(θs, r) = θs log(1+ r).
Assume that Ws(r) = Ws(rs) for all r ≥ rs, i.e. rs is
the maximum desired source rate. Ws(θs, r) is assumed to
be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave
in r on [0, rs]. Let Cs(θs, r0) , Ws(rs) − Ws(rs − r0)
denote the source’s utility loss from having traffic of rate r0
withheld from the network. Equivalently, if r0 is regarded
as the traffic rate routed on a virtual overflow link directly
from s to d [19], then Cs(θs, r0) represents the cost on the
overflow link when the link parameter is θs and the flow
rate is r0. Since Ws(rs) is a constant, it can be seen that
Cs(θs, r0) is continuously differentiable on [θs, θs] × [0, rs],
strictly increasing and convex in r0: ∂Cs(θs, r0)/∂r0 > 0
and ∂2Cs(θs, r0)/∂r20 > 0. Furthermore, we assume that
Cs(θs, r0) is strictly decreasing in θs: ∂Cs(θs, r0)/∂θs < 0.
Finally, it can be seen that Cs(θs, 0) = 0 for all θs. It can
easily be checked that these properties are satisfied for the
example Ws(θs, r) = θs log(1 + r), for which Cs(θs, r0) =
Ws(rs) − θs log(1 + rs − r0). With the aid of the virtual
overflow link, we may view a game with an elastic source
as a game with an inelastic source of rate rs and an overflow
link (s, w) with cost function Cs(θs, r0).
C. Socially Optimal Allocation
A socially optimal traffic allocation in a parallel relay
network is an allocation which minimizes the total network
cost, assumed to be the sum of the link costs. Such an
allocation can be realized through cooperation of the network
nodes. In networks with selfish and strategic nodes, a socially
optimal allocation may or may not be realizable. Nevertheless,
the optimal allocation serves as an important benchmark
with which to measure the amount of potential inefficiency
introduced by selfish and strategic behavior.
Let R , {(r0, r1, ..., rn): rj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . , n,
∑n
j=0 rj =
rs} be the set of feasible traffic allocations, and let r ∈ R
denote the vector of traffic rates in the network, where r0 is
the rate withheld by the source, and ri is the rate routed to
relay i, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that for the case of an inelastic
source, r0 = 0.
Definition 1. A traffic allocation vector r∗ is called socially
optimal if
r
∗ ∈ argmin
r∈R
Cs(θs, r0) +
n∑
i=1
Ci(θi, ri). (2)
Since the link cost functions Ci(θi, ri) as well as Cs(θs, r0)
are all strictly increasing and strictly convex, the socially
optimal allocation r∗ exists and is unique. The conditions
for specifying r∗ can be obtained using the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Let ci(θi, ri) , ∂Ci(θi, ri)/∂ri and cs(θs, r0) ,
∂Cs(θs, r0)/∂r0 denote the marginal cost function of link i
and the marginal cost function of the overflow link for source
s, respectively.
For the case of an inelastic source, r∗ = (0, r∗1 , . . . , r∗n)
is the socially optimal allocation if and only if for each i =
1, . . . , n,
ci(θi, r
∗
i ) = c
∗ if r∗i > 0, ci(θi, r∗i ) > c∗ if r∗i = 0. (3)
For the case of an elastic source, r∗ = (r∗0 , r∗1 , . . . , r∗n) is
the socially optimal allocation if and only if (3) holds and
furthermore,
cs(θs, r
∗
0) = c
∗ if r∗0 > 0, cs(θs, r∗0) > c∗ if r∗0 = 0.
D. Game Structure
Unlike the cooperative setting, in a network consisting of
selfish and strategic nodes, the source as well as the relays
will strategize to maximize their own utility, rather than
work together to minimize the overall network cost. Since
forwarding traffic entails cost, the relays will carry the source’s
traffic only if they are sufficiently well compensated. The
source, on the hand, wishes to have its traffic forwarded at the
smallest possible cost to itself. The natural setting in which to
carry out this game is one which allows for transfer payments
which accompany traffic allocations from the source to the
respective relays.
In this work, we assume that the (maximum) source input
rate rs and the parameter θs are known to all nodes. As dis-
cussed above, the cost function Ci(θi, ri) for relay i depends
on the path quality parameter or type θi. In practical network
settings, the value of this type may be randomly fluctuating.
For instance, in wireless communication, the channel gain
gij fluctuates due to shadowing and fading. In the Internet,
the quality of a particular path may fluctuate according to
network congestion levels. Accordingly, we may assume that
θi is randomly distributed according to distribution function
Fi(θi). In practical network scenarios, the exact realization of
θi is typically known only to relay i, and not to the source or
to the relays other than i. Thus, θi is private information to
relay i. Nevertheless, the source and other relays may still
have knowledge of the distribution Fi(θi). For instance, a
wireless source or a relay j 6= i may know the distribution
of the channel gains for relay i, but typically does not know
the realization of those channel gains. An Internet source or
a path j 6= i may know the distribution of the congestion
level on path i, but does not know the exact realization of the
congestion level.
In order for the source node to allocate its traffic intelli-
gently in the presence of incomplete information regarding the
θi’s, it needs to observe some “signal” from the relay nodes.
This can be realized by having the relay node send a signal
according to the realization of its type to the source.1 Let Mi
be the set of signals for relay i, where Mi is a subset of the
set of differentiable functions on [0, rs]. The signal map for
relay i is
si : Θi →Mi,
where Θi , [θi, θi] and si(θi) = mi(·).
Given the signals mi(·), i = 1, . . . , n, the source decides
on an allocation of its traffic as well as a vector of transfer
payments to the relays. This allocation is called a contract.
Let r = (r0, r1, ..., rn) ∈ R denote the vector of traffic rates
1One can also consider the possibility of the source sending a signal
according to its type θs. However, since we assume θs is known to all network
nodes, we do not consider this possibility here.
in the network, where r0 is the rate withheld by the source,
and ri is the rate routed to relay i, i = 1, . . . , n. Note that for
the inelastic case, r0 = 0. Now let t = (t1, t2, ..., tn) ∈ Rn+
be the vector of transfer payments, where ti is the transfer
payment to relay i. Let M , M1 × · · · ×Mn and T , Rn+.
Then the allocation map of the source node is
g : M → R× T,
where g(m1(·), . . . ,mn(·)) = (r, t).
The above framework encompasses many forms of pricing
games explored in previous literature. For instance, in [16],
the relay signals are simply charging functions Pi(·), and the
transfer payments are required to equal the charges demanded
by the relays, i.e. ti = Pi(ri).
The signal maps of the relays along with the allocation map
of the source realize a corresponding network allocation map
f : Θ→ R × T,
where f(θ1, . . . , θn) = g(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) = (r, t).
In the game with incomplete information corresponding to
the above setting, the utility of the source is given by
Us(θs, g(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) = Ws(rs)−Cs(θs, r0)−
n∑
i=1
ti.
The utility of relay i is given by
Ui(θi, g(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn))) = ti − Ci(θi, ri).
The game with incomplete information proceeds as follows.
First, each relay i observes its own private information θi.
Second, the source provides a contract for the relay nodes.
The contract announces the source allocation rule g : M →
R×T . Third, the relays simultaneously decide to either accept
or reject the contract. If a given relay accepts the contract, then
it will participate in the game which follows. Otherwise, the
relay quits and receives zero utility.2 Fourth and finally, the
relay nodes simultaneously send their signals to the source,
and the source allocates rates and transfer payments according
to the announced g.
In the following, we give the formal definition of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium corresponds to the game with
incomplete information described above. Let θ , (θ1, . . . , θn),
θ−i , (θj)j 6=i, and s−i(θ−i) , (sj(θj))j 6=i.
Definition 2. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the above game
is a set of strategies {s1, . . . , sn, g} satisfying
1. for each relay node i and every feasible s˜i : Θi →Mi,
Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(si(θi), s−i(θ−i)))}
≥ Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(s˜i(θi), s−i(θ−i)))} , (4)
2. for every feasible g˜ : M → R× T ,
Eθ {Us(θs, g(s(θ)))} ≥ Eθ {Us(θs, g˜(s(θ)))} . (5)
2Note that the relays which quit can simply be left out of the game
formulation. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume for the rest of the
paper that the source plays the game in a manner which gives non-negative
expected utility to all relays, so that all relays stay in the game.
III. Games with Limited Source Bargaining Power
We first consider a specific instance of the general game
described in Section II-D in which the source has limited
bargaining power. In this case, the source can only react
passively to the relays’ signals. Specifically, the transfer pay-
ment from the source to any given relay must equal the
relay’s signal function evaluated at the traffic rates routed
to the relay. That is, the source allocation rule is given by
g(m1(·), . . . ,mn(·)) = (r, t), where
r ∈ argmax
r
′∈R
Ws(θs, rs)− Cs(θs, r
′
0)−
n∑
i=1
mi(r
′
i) (6)
ti = mi(ri), i = 1, . . . , n. (7)
Effectively, the relays’ signal functions act as charging func-
tions, and the transfer payments must correspond to the relays’
charges. The source can only allocate its traffic to minimize
the cost of withheld traffic plus the total charges paid to the
relays. In this case, the game can be considered to be a pricing
game.
A. Pricing Game with Complete Information
In this section, we consider the specific pricing game with
complete information where the source has limited bargaining
power and the vector of relay types θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) is
known to all nodes in the network. Note that this is degenerate
version of the game considered in Section II-D where the prior
distribution on the type of relay i available to all nodes is
given by the distribution function Fi(x) = 0 for x < θi and
Fi(x) = 1 for x ≥ θi, where θi is the realization of relay i’s
type.
Since the allocation rule of the source is fixed by (6)-(7), the
knowledge of θ cannot cause the source to adjust its allocation
rule accordingly. Thus, knowledge of θ is not useful to the
source due to its lack of bargaining power. Also, due to the
degenerate prior distribution on θi, we need only consider the
usual concept of Nash equilibrium here. We now show that
in fact all the Nash equilibria in this complete information
pricing game are efficient.
Theorem 1. In the pricing game with complete information,
Nash equilibria exist, and all Nash equilibria are efficient.
Moreover, there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium in which
each relay uses a linear charging function.
Proof: We focus on the case for inelastic sources. The
elastic case can be similarly handled. Since θ = (θ1, . . . , θn)
is known to all nodes in the network, we suppress the
dependence of various quantities on θ. In this game with
limited source bargaining power, the relays’ signals represent
charging functions. Let Bi(ri) be the charge required by relay
i for forwarding traffic of rate ri, and let bi(ri) , B′i(ri) be
the marginal charging function, or pricing function. Let Ci(ri)
and ci(ri) be cost function and marginal cost function for relay
i, respectively.
Let the (unique) socially optimal allocation be r∗ =
(r∗1 , r
∗
2 , ..., r
∗
n). Suppose that there exists a Nash Equilibrium
with charging functions Bi(ri) and corresponding rate alloca-
tion r = (r1, r2, ..., rn) 6= r∗. With a possible re-ordering of
the relay indices, we may assume that ri > r∗i for i < k1,
ri = r
∗
i for k1 ≤ i < k2, and ri < r∗i for i ≥ k2. As r 6= r∗
and both must sum to rs, k1 > 1 and k2 < n.
Since r∗ is the unique socially optimal allocation, from the
optimality conditions, we have
ci(r
∗
i ) = c
∗ if r∗i > 0, ci(r∗i ) > c∗ if r∗i = 0. (8)
where c∗ is the optimal marginal cost. Now by the strict
convexity of Ci(ri),{
ci(r) > c
∗ for all r ∈ [r∗i , ri) if i < k1
ci(r) < c
∗ for all r ∈ (ri, r∗i ] if i > k2
(9)
The profit of relay i for i < k1 is∫ r∗i
0
bi(r) − ci(r)dr +
∫ ri
r∗
i
bi(r) − ci(r)dr. (10)
Since we are at a Nash equilibrium, for all i < k1 and for any
0 < δ < ri − r
∗
i ,
∫ ri
ri−δ
bi(r) − ci(r)dr ≥ 0. For otherwise,
relay i < k1 will deviate to another charging function which
is extremely high from r∗i to ri, so as not to take the extra
traffic ri−r∗i . Now choose ǫ < mini:i<k1 or i≥k2 |ri−r∗i |. Let{
m ∈ argmax1≤i<k1
∫ ri
ri−ǫ
ci(r)dr
l ∈ argmink2≤i≤n
∫ ri+ǫ
ri
ci(r)dr
(11)
By (9), ∫ rm
rm−ǫ
cm(r)dr >
∫ rl+ǫ
rl
cl(r)dr (12)
However, since
∫ rm
rm−ǫ
bm(r) − cm(r)dr ≥ 0, there exists a
charging function B˜l(r) for relay l such that B˜l(r) equals
Bl(r) from 0 to rl, but∫ rm
rm−ǫ
bm(r)dr ≥
∫ rm
rm−ǫ
cm(r)dr
>
∫ rl+ǫ
rl
b˜l(r)dr >
∫ rl+ǫ
rl
cl(r)dr.
(13)
Thus if relay l uses B˜l(r), then in order to maximize its
profit, the source will switch an ǫ amount of traffic from relay
m to relay l. Thus, relay l can deviate to B˜l(r) and get a
higher profit, contradicting our assumption of being at a Nash
equilibrium.
The existence of an efficient Nash equilibrium in which
relays use linear charging functions has been demonstrated
in [16], completing the proof.
B. Pricing Game with Incomplete Information
When the source and the relays j 6= i cannot observe the
type θi of relay i, the source and the relays must content
themselves with maximizing their expected profits. In this
situation, the characterization of Bayesian Nash Equilibria for
general nonlinear charging functions is very difficult. We limit
our discussion to the case where relays bid linear charging
functions, i.e. Bi(θi, ri) = pi(θi)ri, where the price pi(θi)
per unit traffic depends on the type θi. Let wi , p−1i be the
inverse function of pi such that θi = wi(pi(θi)). We assume
that the density fi(θi) is positive over Θi = [θi, θi].
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the source is inelastic, in any Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium, the price function satisfies the following differ-
ential equations:
dwi(pi)
dpi
=
Fi(wi(pi))
(n− 1)fi(wi(pi))
{
−(n− 2)rs
pirs − Ci(wi(pi), rs)
+
∑
j 6=i
rs
pirs − Cj(wj(pi), rs)
}
, (14)
where pi(θi) is given by the inverse of wi(pi).
In particular, in the symmetric situation where Fi(θi) =
F (θi) and Ci(θi, ri) = C(θi, ri) for all i, the Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium satisfies:
pi(θi) =
1
rs
C(θi, rs)−
∫ θi
θ
F (θ)n−1 ∂C(θ,rs)∂θ dθ
F (θi)n−1
 . (15)
Proof: By an argument similar to that in [24], pi(θi)
and wi(pi) are both strictly decreasing functions. Since the
charging functions are linear, the source will always allocate
all its traffic to the relay proposing the lowest price.3 Given the
other relays’ pricing strategies wj(pj), j 6= i, the probability
that relay i proposes the lowest price is given by
Pr{pi < pj for all j 6= i} = Pr{θj < wj(pi) for all j 6= i}
=
∏
j 6=i
Fj(wj(pi))
For each given private type θi, relay i wishes to choose its
price pi to maximize the expected profit
πi(θi, pi) = Pr{pi < pj for all j 6= i}(pirs − Ci(θi, rs))
=
∏
j 6=i
Fj(wj(pi))(pirs − Ci(θi, rs)) (16)
In order to maximize πi(θi, pi), the first-order condition must
be hold:
∂ ln πi(θi, pi)
∂pi
=
∑
j 6=i
1
Fj(wj(pi))
fj(wj(pi))
dwj(pi)
dpi
+
rs
pirs − Ci(θi, rs)
(17)
= 0
After some algebra, we obtain (14).
We now focus on the symmetric situation for an inelastic
source, where Fi(θi) = F (θi) and Ci(θi, ri) = C(θi, ri) for
all i. First, using an argument similar to that in [24], all the
relay nodes should have the same pricing strategy p(θi) and
w(pi). Thus, the expected profit for relay i is
πi(θi, pi) = F (w(pi))
n−1(pirs − C(θi, rs)). (18)
3Note that since θi are continuous random variables and pi(θi) are strictly
decreasing functions, the probability that there are any ties in the relay prices
is zero.
Let the value function for relay i (the maximum profit
for relay i given type θi by choosing the optimal pi(θi)) be
vi(θi) , maxpi πi(θi, pi). By the envelope theorem,
dvi(θi)
dθi
=
∂{F (w(pi))
n−1(pirs − C(θi, rs))}
∂θi
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=pi(θi)
= −F (w(pi))
n−1 ∂C(θi, rs)
∂θi
= −F (θi)
n−1 ∂C(θi, rs)
∂θi
(19)
Since p(θi) is decreasing, the lowest type player must win
zero expected profit, i.e., vi(θ) = 0. Thus,
vi(θi) =
∫ θi
θ
−F (θ)n−1
∂C(θ, rs)
∂θ
dθ. (20)
We now use (18) and (20) to solve for the optimal pricing
function:
pi(θi) = p(θi)
=
1
rs
{
vi(θi)
F (w(pi))n−1
+ C(θi, rs)
}
(21)
=
1
rs
C(θi, rs)−
∫ θi
θ
F (θ)n−1 ∂C(θ,rs)∂θ dθ
F (θi)n−1

The case of an elastic source can be treated in a similar
way. We omit the proof here and simply state the result.
Theorem 3. If the source is elastic, in any Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium, the price function satisfies the following differ-
ential equations:
dwi(pi)
dpi
=
Fi(wi(pi))
(n− 1)fi(wi(pi))
{
−(n− 2)(rs − r0(pi)
pirs − Ci(wi(p), rs − r0)
−
− dr0(pi)dpi (pi −
∂Ci(θi,rs−r0)
∂(rs−r0)
))
pirs − Ci(wi(p), rs − r0)
(22)
+
∑
j 6=i
rs +
drs(pi)
dpi
(pi −
∂Ci(θi,rs−r0)
∂(rs−r0)
)
pirs − Cj(wj(p), rs − r0)
}
where pi(θi) is given by the inverse of wi(pi).
C. Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we measure the inefficiency introduced by
the pricing game with incomplete information. We shall use
the useful measure price of anarchy, defined for each given
type vector θ.
Definition 3. The price of anarchy ρ(θ) for a given type vector
θ in the incomplete information game is
ρ(θ) =
maxri∈RE
∑
i Ci(θi, ri)
minri∈R
∑
i Ci(θi, ri)
(23)
where RE is the set of all traffic allocations corresponding
to Bayesian Nash equilibria, and R is the set of all feasible
traffic allocations.
We shall focus on the case of an inelastic source. The elastic
source case is similar. We consider the symmetric situation
where Fi(θi) = F (θi) and Ci(θi, ri) = C(θi, ri) for all i.
In the case where all relays bid linear charging functions, the
highest type relay will receive all the traffic. Here, the price
of anarchy is determined by
ρ(θ) =
C(maxi∈I θi, rs)
minr∈R
∑
i
C(θi, ri)
(24)
We develop the following bound on ρ(θ).
Theorem 4. In the symmetric linear pricing game with in-
complete information, if the marginal cost function c(θi, ri) =
∂C(θi,ri)
∂ri
is concave, then ρ(θ) ≤ n, where n is the number
of relays, with equality if and only if c(θi, ri) is linear in ri
and the relay types θi are all the same.
Proof: Let (r∗i )ni=1 = (airs)ni=1 be the socially optimal
allocation for a given type realization θ, where
∑n
i=1 ai = 1
and ai ≥ 0 for all i. Thus the optimal cost is
C∗ =
n∑
i=1
∫ airs
0
c(θi, ri)dri (25)
Since c(θi, ri) is concave, it can be shown that∫ airs
0
c(θi, ri)dri ≥ a
2
i
∫ rs
0
c(θi, ri)dri, where equality
holds if and only if c(θi, ri) is linear in ri. Thus we have
C∗ ≥
n∑
i=1
a2i
∫ rs
0
c(θi, ri)dri (26)
Therefore,
ρ(θ) =
∫ rs
0 c(maxi θi, ri)dri∑n
i=1
∫ airs
0 c(θi, ri)dri
≤
∫ rs
0 c(maxi θi, ri)dri∑n
i=1 a
2
i
∫ rs
0 c(θi, ri)dri
(27)
≤
∫ rs
0 c(maxi θi, ri)dri∑n
i=1 a
2
i
∫ rs
0 c(maxi θi, ri)dri
=
1∑n
i=1 a
2
i
≤ n
where the second inequality follows from the assumption that
∂2Ci(θi, ri)/∂θi∂ri ≤ 0. Equality obtains in all three previous
inequalities if c(θi, ri) is linear in ri and the relay types θi
are all the same.
Next, we give a general bound on the price of anarchy for
all cost functions satisfying our assumptions in Section II.
Theorem 5. In the symmetric linear pricing game with
incomplete information, let the support set for each θi be
Θ , [θ, θ]. If the marginal cost function c(θi, ri) = ∂C(θi,ri)∂ri
satisfies c(θ,rs)
c(θ,0)
≤ k for some constant k, then ρ(θ) ≤ k.
Proof: Since C(θi, ri) is convex in ri and
∂2Ci(θi, ri)/∂θi∂ri ≤ 0 by assumption, c(θi, ri) ≥ c(θi, 0) ≥
c(maxi θi, ri) ≥ c(θ, 0). Also c(maxi θi, ri) ≤ c(θ, rs). Thus,∑n
i=1
∫ airs
0
c(θi, ri)dri ≥ c(θ, 0)rs, and
∫ rs
0
c(maxi θi, ri)dri
≤ c(θ, rs)rs. The result follows.
Recall our result that all Nash equilibria in the complete
information pricing game are efficient, including any which
results from linear pricing. Thus, we see that incomplete
information can introduce inefficiencies. The main insight is
that in an incomplete information pricing game, the relays
cannot calculate the socially optimal traffic allocation due to
the lack of information regarding types. Therefore, the relays
cannot bid the marginal cost at the socially optimal outcome
as the price, Thus, the game cannot reach an efficient Nash
Equilibrium.
Although Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not efficient in the
symmetric linear pricing game with incomplete information,
they satisfy an asymptotic efficient property: the outcome
of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium when rs goes to zero is
efficient. To see this, note that by [24], all the relay pricing
functions in the symmetric case are the same and decreasing.
Thus the highest type relay will always get all the traffic. When
rs goes to zero, the efficient allocation also allocates all the
traffic to the highest type relay. Thus, in the symmetric case, a
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is efficient when rs goes to zero.
We now show, however, that in the asymmetric linear
pricing game with incomplete information, the Bayesian Nash
Equilibria are not efficient even when rs goes to zero. We
focus on the case of two relays, where the cost functions
of the relays are identical, but the distributions of the types
are different. Using Theorem 2, we obtain the following
differential equations:
dw1
dp
= −
rsF1(w1(p))
(prs − C(w2, rs))f1(w1)
dw2
dp
= −
rsF2(w2(p))
(prs − C(w1, rs))f2(w2)
Explicitly solving for the solution is difficult, but we can
observe some properties of the solution. First, we must have
p1(θ) = p2(θ) = pmin.
This is because if the relay prices for the highest type are
not the same, then the relay with the higher price will lower
its price to increase its probability of winning the game,
thus increasing the expected revenue. From the differential
equations, we obtain
w1(p) = θ −
∫ p
pmin
rsF1(w1(p))
(prs − C(w2(p), rs))f1(w1(p))
dp (28)
w2(p) = θ −
∫ p
pmin
rsF2(w2(p))
(prs − C(w1(p), rs))f2(w2(p))
dp (29)
For a given p, let θ1 and θ2 be such that p1(θ1) = p2(θ2) =
p. From the above equations, it is clear that w1(p) 6= w2(p),
i.e. θ1 6= θ2. Therefore, we have a situation where two
relays with different type propose the same price. When this
realization occurs, the highest type relay does not carry all the
traffic, even when rs goes to zero. Thus, in the asymmetric
case, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not asymptotic efficient
as rs goes to zero.
IV. Games with Full Source Bargaining Power
In the discussion thus far, the source has limited bargaining
power, and passively reacts to the relays’ signals, which are
equivalent to charging functions. The source can only allocate
its traffic to minimize its cost in withheld traffic plus the total
transfer payment to the relays. In this section, we examine
the scenario where the source has full bargaining power, in
the sense that the contract announced by the source is not
limited to the one described in (6)-(7). We first investigate the
(Bayesian) Nash equilibria which can result from games with
source bargaining power in the case of complete information.
Here, we show that all (Bayesian) Nash equilibria are efficient.
Then, we proceed to the case of incomplete information, and
characterize the potential inefficiencies associated with that
case.
A. Games with Complete Information
In a game with source bargaining power and complete
information, the source can observe the type vector θ =
(θ1, . . . , θn) of the relays, and then design the allocation map
g according to θ. Since the type θi is not private to relay
i, relay i cannot manipulate this information in designing its
signalling strategy si. Since the source can observe θ, it can
effectively ignore the strategies of the relays in designing g.
Nevertheless, the source needs to ensure that the relays will
accept its proposed contract and stay in the game. The latter
will hold as long as Ui(θi, g(θ)) = ti − Ci(θi, ri) ≥ 0 for all
i. That is, all relays receive non-negative utility by accepting
the contract proposed by the source, and therefore are willing
to participate in the game.
Lemma 1. In any (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium of the com-
plete information game with source bargaining power, all
relays receive zero utility.
Proof: Suppose that there exists a (Bayesian) Nash Equi-
librium where the source allocation rule
g(m1(·), ...,mn(·)) = (r, t)
is such that Ui(θi, ri, ti) = ti−Ci(θi, ri) > 0 for some i. Since
the source can observe θ, it could select another allocation rule
g′(m1(·), ...,mn(·)) = (r
′, t′) such that
r′i = ri, i = 1, . . . , n; t
′
i = ti − ǫ, t
′
j = tj for all j 6= i
where ǫ is small enough so that t′i−Ci(θi, r′i) > 0. Note that
the set of relays which would opt to accept contract g and
stay in the game is the same as the set for contract g′. On
the other hand, by shifting its allocation rule from g to g′, the
source has strictly decreased its total transfer payment, while
keeping the same traffic allocation. Thus, the source’s utility
is strictly increased. This contradicts our assumption of being
at a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6. In the complete information game with source
bargaining power, all (Bayesian) Nash equilibria are efficient.
Proof: At any Nash equilibrium, the source maximizes
its utility
Us(θs, g(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) = Ws(θs, rs)−Cs(θs, r0)−
n∑
i=1
ti.
By Lemma 1, at the equilibrium, we have ti = Ci(θi, ri)
for all i. Thus, the traffic allocation by the source minimizes
Cs(θs, r0) +
∑n
i=1 Ci(θi, ri), and therefore the equilibrium is
efficient.
Using Lemma 1 and Theorem 6, we can easily solve
for the Nash equilibrium of the complete information game
with source bargaining power. By Theorem 6, the source
allocation rule at the equilibrium may be obtained by solving
for the socially optimal traffic allocation r∗, where r∗ =
argmaxr∈R Cs(θs, r0) +
∑n
i=1 Ci(θi, ri). As noted in Sec-
tion II-C, due to the strict convexity of the optimization prob-
lem, r∗ exists and is unique. By Lemma 1, at the equilibrium,
the transfer payment ti = Ci(θi, r∗i ) for every i = 1, . . . , n.4
For the relays, any feasible signal map si may be chosen for
the equilibrium.
To see why this constitutes an equilibrium, note the follow-
ing sequence of events in the game with source bargaining
power. First, each relay i observes its type θi. Second, the
source provides the contract g : M → (r∗, t), where r∗ is
the socially optimal traffic allocation, and ti = Ci(θi, r∗i ) for
every i. Note that g is independent of the signals sent by the
relays. Third, the relays accept the mechanism because they
each receive zero utility, and therefore are indifferent with
respect to carrying traffic or not. Fourth and finally, the relay
nodes will play signal map si without deviation, since the
source allocation map is independent of the relays’ signals.
Thus, the Nash equilibrium holds and is unique.
B. Games with Incomplete Information
We now turn to the case that source cannot observe the type
of relay. Thus the relay nodes can manipulate their types in
order to get more utility, and the source can no longer design
the allocation according to θ. As in incomplete information
games without bargaining power, the source must maximize
the expectation of profits according to the signals sent by re-
lays. The characterization of Bayesian Nash Equilibria for this
case is very difficult due to the complexity of the strategy set
and the possible behaviors of source and relays. Nevertheless,
we devise a method for characterizing outcomes corresponding
to the Bayesian Nash Equilibria which avoids the difficulty of
calculating the the equilibria explicitly. We shall do this in two
steps. First, we show that if a resource allocation outcome can
be realized by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a game with
source bargaining in which every relay receives non-negative
expected utility, then there exists a “truth telling” Bayesian
Nash equilibrium that realizes the outcome. Second, we show
that the set of outcomes for the “truth telling” Bayesian Nash
equilibria is included in the set of outcomes for the Nash
equilibria for a complete information game, in which the
4Recall that Ci(θi, 0) = 0.
link cost functions are replaced by a specified “virtual cost
functions.”
Definition 4. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game with
bargaining power is truth telling if M = Θ and every relay
node is willing to report their true type to the source node.
Theorem 7. If a resource allocation outcome f can be real-
ized by a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game with source
bargaining power, in which every relay receives non-negative
expected utility, then there exists a truth telling Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium which realizes f .
Proof: Suppose there is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
which realizes the allocation outcome f(θ). By the definition
of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, we have (4) and (5). Now
observe that by (4), we must have
θi ∈ argmax
θ˜i
Eθ−i
{
Ui(θi, g(si(θ˜i), s−i(θ−i)))
}
(30)
for all i. Otherwise, if there exists some
θ′ such that Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(si(θ′i), s−i(θ−i)))}
> Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(si(θi), s−i(θ−i)))}, then there is another
strategy s′i(θ) satisfying s′i(θi) = si(θ′i) and s′i(θ) = si(θ)
for all θ 6= θi, such that Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(s′i(θi), s−i(θ−i)))}
> Eθ−i {Ui(θi, g(si(θi), s−i(θ−i)))}, violating (4). Therefore,
since g(s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) = f(θ), we have
θi ∈ arg max
θ˜i∈Θi
Eθ−i
{
Ui(θi, f(θ˜i, θ−i))
}
for all i (31)
f ∈ argmax
f˜
Eθ
{
Us(θs, f˜(θ))
}
. (32)
Thus, there exists a direct truth telling Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium with the outcome f(θ).
Theorem 7 says that the set of outcomes corresponding to
Bayesian Nash Equilibria for the game with source bargaining
power and incomplete information is a subset of the outcomes
corresponding to truth telling Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in
which each relay proposes its type truthfully to the source, and
the source optimally allocates rates according to the relays’
types. This finding simplifies our analysis considerably, since
we can now focus on the truth telling Bayesian Nash Equilibria
in order to bound the efficiency loss introduced by incomplete
information in games with source bargaining power.
We now investigate the outcomes which can be realized
by truth telling Bayesian Nash Equilibria. Notice that these
equilibria correspond to the solutions of the optimization
problem given by (31) and (32), in addition to the non-negative
expected utility constraint
Eθ−i {Ui(θi, ri)} = Eθ−i {ti(θ, r)− Ci(θi, ri(θ))} ≥ 0
(33)
for all i, and feasibility constraint r ∈ R.
Theorem 8. The set of solutions for the optimization problem
defined by (31)-(33) is included in the set of outcomes corre-
sponding to the Nash equilibria for the complete information
game in which the link cost functions Ci(θi, ri) are replaced
by
Ji(θi, ri) = Ci(θi, ri)−
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
∂Ci(θi, ri)
∂θi
. (34)
Proof: Please see the Appendix.
We refer to the functions Ji as virtual cost functions.
Note that by Theorem 6, all Nash equilibria corresponding
to games with complete information are efficient. Thus, the
set of outcomes corresponding to the Nash equilibria for the
complete information game with virtual link cost functions
Ji(θi, ri) is given by
r
′ = argmin
r∈R
Cs(θs, r0) +
n∑
i=1
Ji(θi, ri).
If Ji(θi, ri) is strictly convex in ri for all i, then the
optimization problem has a unique solution. For instance, if
all the relays’ types θi are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and
the cost functions are given by 1θi (e
ri − 1), then Ji(θi, ri) =
Ci(θi, ri)−
1−Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
∂Ci(θi,ri)
∂θi
= 1
θ2
i
(eri − 1), which is strictly
convex in ri and strictly decreasing in θi. In this case, if
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game with source bar-
gaining power exists, then the corresponding traffic allocation
is the solution of the optimization problem. In general, the
set of traffic allocations corresponding to the Bayesian Nash
Equilibria (of the game with source bargaining power) is a
subset of the solution set for the optimization. In the next
section, we use this fact to bound the efficiency loss for games
with incomplete information.
C. Efficiency Analysis
In this section, we bound the amount of inefficiency in the
outcomes for games with incomplete information. We focus
on the inelastic scenario where r0 = 0. Following [7], define
the price of anarchy for type θ as:
ρ(θ) =
max
r∈RE
∑
i
Ci(θi, ri)
minr∈R
∑
i
Ci(θi, ri)
(35)
where RE is the set of all Bayesian Nash Equilibria
for the game with incomplete information. Let RJ ≡
argminr∈R
∑
i Ji(θi, ri). By Theorems 7 and 8, we have
RE ⊆ RJ . Therefore,
ρ(θ) ≤
max
r∈RJ
∑
i
Ci(θi, ri)
minr∈R
∑
i
Ci(θi, ri)
(36)
Since the link cost functions are strictly convex, the socially
optimal allocation r∗ are given by the necessary and sufficient
conditions in (3). An allocation r′ in RJ must satisfy the
following necessary conditions: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that r′i > 0,
∂C(θi, r
′
i)
∂ri
−
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
∂2C(θi, r
′
i)
∂θi∂ri
(37)
≤
∂C(θj , r
′
j)
∂rj
−
1− Fj(θj)
fj(θj)
∂2C(θi, r
′
j)
∂θi∂rj
for all j
We now bound the price of anarchy in the symmetric case.
Theorem 9. Consider the symmetric case where the link
cost functions Ci(θi, ri) and the type distributions Fi(θi) are
the same for all relays. If (i) J(θi, ri) is convex in ri and
decreasing in θi, (ii) X(θi, ri) ≡ J(θi, ri) − C(θi, ri) is
concave in ri, (iii) ∂X(θi,ri)∂θi∂ri ≤ 0, then the price of anarchy
ρ(θ) can be upper bounded as follows.
If the marginal cost function c(θi, ri) = ∂C(θi,ri)∂ri is con-
cave, then ρ(θ) ≤ n, where n is the number of relays (with
equality if and only if c(θi, ri) is linear in ri and the relay
types θi are all the same). If c(θ,rs)c(θ,0) ≤ k for some constant k,
then ρ(θ) ≤ k.
Note that for the example where all the relays’ types θi are
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and the cost functions are given
by 1θi (e
ri − 1), the assumptions of the Theorem are satisfied.
Proof: Let (r′i)i∈I ∈ argmini
∑
i J(θi, ri), and (r∗i ) be
the efficient allocation. We first prove that if θm > θk, and
rm + rk = rmk is fixed, r′m ≥ r∗m. If for any θk < θm,
r′k = 0, then the inequality immediately holds. We then
consider the situation that there exists some θk < θm and
r′k > 0. Let x(θi, ri) =
∂X(θi,ri)
∂ri
. Thus for the optimal
allocation, r∗m > r∗k > 0 and r∗m + r∗k = rmk. As
x(θi, ri) is decreasing in θi, we have x(θm, r∗k) ≤ x(θk, r∗k).
As x(θi, ri) is decreasing in ri, x(θm, r∗m) ≤ x(θm, r∗k).
Thus x(θm, r∗m) ≤ x(θk, r∗k). As c(θm, r∗m) = c(θk, r∗k) ,
c(θm, r
∗
m) + x(θm, r
∗
m) ≤ c(θk, r
∗
k) + x(θk, r
∗
k). By (37),
c(θm, r
′
m) + x(θm, r
′
m) ≥ c(θk, r
′
k) + x(θk, r
′
k), as r
′
k > 0.
As r∗k + r∗m = rmk = r′k + r′m, and virtual cost function is
convex, we have r′m ≥ r∗m.
Now we prove that
∑
i C(θi, r
′
i) ≤ C(maxi θi, rs). Without
loss of generality, we assume that θ1 < θ2 < ... < θn. Any
situation where some types are the same can be handled by
modifying number of relays. We have
min∑
i ri=rs
∑
i
C(θi, ri)
= min∑
i
ri=rs
[
C(θn, rn)
+ min∑
i<n
ri=rs−rn
[∑
i>1
C(θn−1, rn−1) + min ...
+ min
r1+r2=rs−
∑
i>2
ri
C(θ2, r2) + C(θ1, r1)
]
· · ·
]
As we showed above, r′i ≥ r∗i given r′i + r′i−1 = r∗i + r∗i−1 =
ri,i−1. Thus C(θi, ri,i−1) ≥ C(θi, r′i) + C(θi−1, r′i−1) ≥
C(θi, r
∗
i ) + C(θi−1, r
∗
i−1). By induction, we can prove that∑
i C(θi, r
′
i) ≤ C(maxi θi, rs). Now using the same technique
as in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5, we obtain the result.
If either the virtual cost functions Ji(θi, ri) are not convex,
or the link cost functions and type distributions are not the
same across relays, then higher prices of anarchy may result.
Consider the situation in Figure 2. Here, there are only two
relays. (r∗1 , rs − r∗1) is the efficient allocation. Since the type
distributions are not the same, the marginal virtual costs are
as indicated in the figure. To minimize the sum of the virtual
costs, the source allocates all traffic to relay 2, while this
allocation is clearly the worst outcome for minimizing the
sum of the link costs.
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Fig. 2. Efficiency Loss in Asymmetric Case
V. CONCLUSION
This work investigated the impact of incomplete information
on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks.
We considered two situations in which source either has partial
bargaining power or full bargaining power. For the situation
where the source has partial bargaining power, we have shown
that all Nash Equilibria in the complete information game are
efficient, including those induced by linear charging functions.
We then characterized the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the
incomplete information game in which relays propose linear
pricing functions, and showed that incomplete information can
induce inefficiencies, which are exacerbated by asymmetric
prior knowledge on the type distribution. In the situation
where the source has full bargaining power, we first showed
that in the game with complete information, (Bayesian) Nash
equilibria exist and are all efficient. Next, we investigated the
game with incomplete information. To deal with the difficulty
of characterizing the Bayesian Nash Equilibria in this case,
we first showed that if a resource allocation outcome can be
realized by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a “truth telling” Bayesian Nash equilibrium that realizes the
outcome. We then showed that the set of outcomes for the
“truth telling” Bayesian Nash equilibria is included in the set
of outcomes for the Nash equilibria for a complete information
game, in which the link cost functions are replaced by a
specified “virtual cost functions.” Using this approach, we
obtained for a symmetric network scenario a bound on the
amount of inefficiency which may result from incomplete
information.
VI. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 8: The first and second-order conditions
for (31) are:
dEθ−i
{
Ui(θi, f(θ˜i, θ−i))
}
dθ˜i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
= 0 (38)
and
d2Eθ−i
{
Ui(θi, f(θ˜i, θ−i))
}
dθ˜i
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
≤ 0. (39)
The first-order condition is equivalent to
Eθ−i
dti(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
(40)
= Eθ−i
{
∂Ci(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i))
∂ri
dri(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
}∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
.(41)
The second-order condition is equivalent to
Eθ−i
d2ti(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
2
∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
≤ Eθ−i
∂2Ci(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i))∂r2i
[
dri(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
]2
(42)
+
∂Ci(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i))
∂ri
d2ri(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
2
}∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
.
By evaluating the first-order condition at θi differentiating
with respect to θi, we get:
Eθ−i
{
d2 {ti(θi, θ−i)}
dθ2i
}
= Eθ−i
{
∂2Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂r2i
[
dri(θi, θ−i)
dθi
]2
(43)
+
∂Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂ri
d2ri(θi, θ−i)
dθ2i
+
∂2Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂ri∂θi
dri(θi, θ−i)
dθi
}
.
Comparing with the second-order condition, we get
Eθ−i
∂2Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂ri∂θi
dri(θi, θ−i)
dθi
≤ 0. (44)
We have already assumed that
∂2Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂ri∂θi
≤ 0 for each θ−i. (45)
Notice that when an outcome can be realized by a Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium, the following condition must hold:
∂ri(θi, θ−i)
∂θi
≥ 0 given any θ−i (46)
Otherwise, the source would allocate a higher rate to a lower
type relay, which is not optimal. Notice that by (45) and (46),
(44) automatically holds.
Thus, the following conditions are necessary for the first
and second-order conditions to hold.
dEθ−i
{
ti(θ˜i, θ−i)
}
dθ˜i
= Eθ−i
∂Ci(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i))
∂ri
dri(θ˜i, θ−i)
dθ˜i
∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
∂ri(θi, θ−i)
∂θi
≥ 0 given any θ−i
Let Vi(θi, θ−i) = maxθ˜i Ui(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i), ti(θ˜i, θ−i)). We
use the envelope theorem just as we did in the previous
sections:
dEθ−iVi(θi, θ−i)
dθi
=
∂Eθ−iUi(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i), ti(θ˜i, θ−i)
∂θi
∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
= −
∂Eθ−iCi(θi, ri(θ˜i, θ−i))
∂θi
∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜i=θi
(47)
Let θi and θi be the upper and lower bounds on relay node
i’s type, then
Eθ−iVi(θi, θ−i) (48)
= Eθ−iVi(θi, θ−i)−
∫ θi
θi
∂Eθ−iCi(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂θi
dθi
We see from the above equation that, as we already assumed
∂Ci(θi,ri)
∂θi
< 0, the expected utility of relay i is non-decreasing
with respect to θi. Thus, to guarantee that constraints (33)
holds, the lowest type must receive non-negative profit. On the
other hand, the relay with the lowest type can never receive
a positive profit, otherwise the source will reduce its profit
by some small amount and still guarantee that the contract is
acceptable to all, which contradicts the definition of Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium. Thus, the lowest type relay should receive
zero profit.
Eθ−iVi(θi, θ−i) = 0 (49)
Plugging in, we get
Eθ−iVi(θi, θ−i) = −
∫ θi
θi
∂Eθ−iCi(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
∂θi
dθi (50)
Suppose the type distribution function of relay i is Fi(θi)
and the density is fi(θi). Let R be the expected revenue of
the source node. Then,
R = Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)−
∑
i
ti(θ)
}
= Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)−
∑
i
Vi(θ) −
∑
i
Ci(θ)
}
= Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)−
∑
i
Ci(θ)
}
+
∑
i
∫ θi
θi
fi(θi)Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(θ
′
i, ri(θ
′
i, θ−i))
∂θ′i
dθ′i
]
dθi
= Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)−
∑
i
Ci(θ)
}
−
∑
i
∫ θi
θi
Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(θ
′
i, ri(θ
′
i, θ−i))
∂θ′i
dθ′i
]
×d(1− Fi(θi))
= Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, rs)−
∑
i
Ci(θ)
}
−
∑
i
Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(θ
′
i, ri(θ
′
i, θ−i))
∂θ′i
dθ′i
]
×(1− Fi(θi))|
θi
θi
+
∑
i
Eθ−i
∫ θi
θi
(1− Fi(θi))
×d
[∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(θ
′
i, ri(θ
′
i, θ−i))
∂θ′i
dθ′i
]
= Eθ
{
Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)−
∑
i
Ci(θ)
}
+
∑
i
Eθ−i
∫ θi
θi
(1− Fi(θi))
×d
[∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(θ
′
i, ri(θ
′
i, θ−i))
∂θ′i
dθ′i
]
= Eθ{Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)}
−
∑
i
Eθ−i
∫ θi
θi
Ci(θi, ri(θi, θ−i))
−
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
∂Ci(θi, ri(θ))
∂θi
fi(θi)dθi
= Eθ[Ws(rs)− Cs(θs, r0)]
−Eθ
∑
i
(
Ci(θi, ri(θ)) −
1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
∂Ci(θi, ri(θ))
∂θi
)
Thus, we obtain a game with complete information and
full source bargaining power where the revenue function is
changed to Ji(θi, ri) rather than Ci(θi, ri).
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